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The effect of public attitudes towards the EU on European Commission policy activity 
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This study tests the relationship between public attitudes regarding the European Union and 
unilateral adoption of legal acts by the European Commission (i.e. directives and regulations). 
Relying on theories of policy responsiveness, as well as legislative gridlock, we present two 
hypotheses with competing expectations regarding the effect of public attitudes towards the EU 
on policy-making activity in the European Commission. The first hypothesis suggests that the 
Commission will unilaterally adopt more legal acts when public support for the EU is greater, 
while the second hypothesis suggests that the Commission will unilaterally adopt fewer legal acts 
when public support for the EU is greater. Using time series error correction models and data from 
Eurobarometer surveys from 1974-2008, and the EU's online legislative archive (EUR-Lex), these 
hypotheses are tested. The results support the second hypothesis, suggesting that the European 
Commission will increase unilateral legal act adoption when public attitudes are more negative 
towards the EU, while decreasing unilateral legal act adoption when the public is more Europhilic. 
These findings indicate a possibility of responsibility trading between the institutions of the EU 
and have important implications for our understandings of European policy processes, political 
responsiveness, and democratic governance in the EU.  
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The responsiveness of the European Union (EU) to the public remains a contentious issue among 
European leaders, the media, the public, and academics alike. The popular understanding of 
Europe as a government that suffers from a “democratic deficit” has served to fuel public 
Euroscepticism, as well as a rise in anti-EU political parties, and has certainly played a role in 
creating conditions which led to the current “Brexit” crisis in the United Kingdom. 
 
At the same time, recent research has suggested that there is a clear interplay between aggregate 
public attitudes towards the EU, and policy-making activity in the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011; Franklin and Wlezien, 1997). This study 
builds on this existing literature and seeks to develop an original understanding of the relationship 
between public opinion concerning the EU and policy-making activity in the European 
Commission. Specifically, we ask, do public attitudes regarding the EU affect the unilateral 
adoption of European Commission legal acts? 
 
Understanding the connection between public attitudes towards the EU and the adoption of 
European Commission legal acts (directives, regulations, and decision; although this study is only 
concerned with directives and regulations) is particularly important as these acts greatly affect EU 
policy. Commission legal acts, in the form of implementing acts, determine how member states 
put EU policies into action. Additionally, Commission legal acts, in the form of delegated acts, 
can actually alter EU policies without further consulting the Council of Ministers or European 
Parliament. Both implementing acts and delegated acts have significant effects upon how EU 
policies are integrated into European and member state law, as well as the substance of European 
policies.  Therefore, developing a clearer knowledge of how public opinion regarding the EU 
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influences policy-making in the European Commission has important implications for the study of 
European policy processes. 
 
Further, understanding how public attitudes towards the EU are related to policy-making activity 
in the European Commission has important implications for the study of policy responsiveness, 
political representation, and democracy in Europe. Democracy is predicated on the assumption 
that the provisions of public policy are related to the wishes of the citizens, and that policy changes 
are linked to the changing opinions of citizens (Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 1967; Powell, 2000). If the 
Commission directly responds to public attitudes regarding European integration when creating 
policy, this indicates that at least one of the EU institutions is responsive to the public on issues 
concerning European policy and integration. This would further imply that the European 
democratic deficit may not be as pronounced as previously believed (for more on the democratic 
deficit, see Føllesdal and Hix, 2006).i 
 
Despite the importance of understanding how public attitudes are related to EU policy processes 
generally, and unilateral European Commission policy activity specifically, there is a scarcity of 
literature that systematically explores this relationship. Franklin and Wlezien (1997) first 
attempted to examine the interaction between policy output in the EU and public attitudes towards 
the EU. They contended, following the thermostatic theory of representation (see Wlezien, 1995, 
2004), that public attitudes towards the EU are responsive to the level of policy created by the EU. 
In testing this relationship, Franklin and Wlezien (1997) showed that policy output is negatively 
related to support for unification, both when the salience of European unification is and is not 
interacted with policy output. Simply put, they found that as more European policies are adopted, 
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support for unification decreases, and, as fewer European policies are adopted, support for 
unification increases. 
 
Toshkov (2011) extended Franklin and Wlezien’s (1997) study, examining both how policy 
output, measured as non-Commission directives, affects public opinion concerning the EU, as well 
as how public attitudes towards the EU affect the number of non-Commission directives adopted 
by the EU. He found that public support for the EU affects the overall number of directives adopted 
by the Council of Ministers and European Parliament, and that changes in policy output are 
particularly noticeable about one year after public support changes. However, no statistically 
significant effect of policy outputs on public support for the EU was found. 
 
More recently, Bølstad (2015) examined the effect of both public opinion concerning the EU in 
the six original member states (“Core” countries), as well as the three member states that joined 
the EU in 1973 (“Periphery” countries) on European policy output. Bølstad (2015: 15) found that 
public attitudes towards the EU influence integration, with greater positivity towards the EU in 
both the “Core” countries and “Periphery” countries leading to the passage of more non-
Commission directives.  
 
Additionally, recent research has examined how public attitudes towards the EU influence member 
state responses to European public policy (Williams, 2018, 2016). This research finds that higher 
levels of public opposition to the EU in a member state lead state governments to both delay 
directive transposition (Williams, 2018), and issue more reasoned opinions through the “Early 
Warning System” (Williams, 2016). 
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While inconclusive regarding the effect of policy output on public opinion, the above research 
suggests that public attitudes towards the EU influence the adoption of policy in the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament, as well as influencing member state engagement with 
European policy processes.  
 
More specifically to the European Commission, recent research has begun examining policy 
responsiveness to public attitudes regarding the EU in this institution. For example, Häge and 
Toshkov (2011), and Crombez and Hix (2016) have included public support for the EU as a control 
variable when studying the initiation of EU policies.ii Further, Rauh (2016) has studied how 
politicization of the EU has influenced the policy choices made in the Commission, with a focus 
on the policy area of consumer protection. While this work is certainly an important first step in 
understanding how public attitudes influence Commission policy-making activity, it does not fully 
address this relationship. Therefore, this study attempts to examine more deeply the possible 
connection between public attitudes towards the EU and policy-making activity in the European 
Commission, specifically, the unilateral adoption of Commission legal acts. 
 
By using Eurobarometer public opinion survey data, as well as data concerning the unilateral 
adoption of Commission legal acts between 1974 and 2008, the results of this study suggest high 
levels of support for the EU lead to decreased unilateral legal act adoption in the Commission, 




Public attitudes’ influence on policy 
A myriad of studies has examined policy responsiveness to public opinion (e.g. Bevan and 
Jennings, 2014; Bølstad, 2015; Erikson et al., 2002; Glazier and Boydstun, 2012; Page and 
Shapiro, 1983; Soroka and Wlezien, 2004; Stimson et al., 1995; Williams, 2018, 2016; Wlezien, 
1995, 2004), finding that governments tend to respond to the public regarding policy (see e.g. 
Stimson et al., 1995; Soroka and Wlezien, 2004, 2010; Wlezien, 1995, 2004). The overarching 
theoretical theme within most of the policy responsiveness literature rests on the idea that the 
public controls governments and parties through the threat of electoral retribution and/or the 
promise of electoral victory (see Erikson et al., 1993; Ferejohn, 1986; Hobolt and Klemmensen, 
2008; Stimson et al., 1995). Simply put, policy-makers wish to win re-election, and therefore, 
respond to the public’s policy concerns. 
 
In terms of public attitudes towards the EU, research has extended the literature on policy 
responsiveness (see Bølstad, 2015; Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Toshkov, 2011; Williams, 2016, 
2018), suggesting that higher levels of public support for the EU (aggregate public Europhilia) 
indicate a general public attitude for greater integration, and lower levels of public support for the 
EU indicate a general public attitude for less integration (see Bølstad, 2015; Franklin and Wlezien, 
1997; Toshkov, 2011; Williams, 2016). In fact, Franklin and Wlezien (1997) show that, beginning 
in the 1970s, measures of public support for or opposition to the EU behave similarly to measures 
of preferred policy levels in other policy domains. 
 
Moreover, increasing European-level policy-making is understood in the literature as increasing 
European integration (see Bølstad, 2015; Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Williams, 2016). Therefore, 
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the application of the above theories of policymaker responsiveness to public policy preferences 
would lead to the expectation that EU institutions will produce more policy when public support 
for the EU is higher, and produce less policy when public support for the EU is lower, as public 
support for the EU is understood as a public desire for more integration, and more policy-making 
is understood as increasing integration. In fact, this is the finding of Toshkov (2011) and Bølstad 
(2015) regarding the relationship between public attitudes towards the EU and policy-making in 
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
 
Applying this logic to the Commission, however, becomes more complicated. Unlike the 
Parliament and Council of Ministers, which are directly and indirectly elected, respectively (see 
Moravscik, 2002), the Commission is unelected. Thus, a desire for re-election cannot causally 
drive Commission responsiveness to public attitudes. This does not necessarily imply, however, 
that Commission policy activity will be unrelated to public attitudes regarding the EU. 
 
Substantial literature suggests, theoretically and empirically, that unelected bodies do respond to 
public attitudes (see Bevan, 2015; Bølstad, 2015; Casillas et al., 2011; Rauh, 2016; Toshkov, 
2011). Most notable among this research is that concerning the United States Supreme Court (see 
Casillas et al., 2011; Giles et al., 2008; Hall, 2013; McGuire and Stimson, 2004; Mishler and 
Sheehan, 1993, 1996; Norpoth and Segal, 1994), which, like the European Commission, is also 
unelected.  
 
The majority of this literature has found a connection between public opinion and Court decision-
making. Recent research (see Casillas et al., 2011; Hall, 2013; McGuire and Stimson, 2004), has 
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suggested that this relationship exists because the Court wishes to maintain legitimacy and avoid 
non-implementation of decisions (Casillas et al., 2011; Giles et al., 2008; Hall, 2013; McGuire and 
Stimson, 2004).  As McGuire and Stimson (2004: 1019) wrote:  
...a Court that cares about its perceived legitimacy must rationally anticipate 
whether its preferred outcomes will be respected and faithfully followed by 
relevant publics. Consequently, a Court that strays too far from the broad 
boundaries imposed by public mood risks having its decisions rejected…In the 
aggregate…popular opinion should still shape the broad contours of judicial 
policymaking.   
 
In addition to work on the United States Supreme Court, the literature regarding bureaucratic 
behavior follows a similar theoretical perspective. This research has suggested that bureaucratic 
decisions derive, in part, from a desire to maintain legitimacy, and ensure that its decisions are 
sustainable (see Bevan, 2015; also see Tsebelis, 1995; Wilson, 1989). If bureaucrats wish to 
maintain legitimacy and produce sustainable decisions, it follows that they would want elected 
officials and the public to accept those decisions.  
 
The desire to maintain legitimacy and the accompanying fear of non-implementation can be 
applied to understanding policy responsiveness in the European Commission. Like other unelected 
bodies, the Commission should be concerned with maintaining legitimacy for fear of having its 
authority rejected by member states and other institutions (see Bølstad, 2015), which may, in turn, 
refuse to implement and/or enforce European policy. As a large number of European policies, and 
often important policies (see Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011), come in the form of directives, which 
must be implemented by member states, the fear of losing legitimacy and the subsequent non-
implementation of policies is a significant threat to Commission power. This theoretical 
understanding is further supported by research indicating that EU member states do, in fact, resist 
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EU power by delaying directive transposition when aggregate public Euroscepticism is greater 
(Williams, 2018). Moreover, this understanding is similar to the theoretical argument put forth by 
Rauh (2016), who found that the Commission, in a desire to avoid undermining public support for 
integration, alters consumer protection policy choices based on the level of attention European 
policy-making receives from the public.  
 
Based on the above theory, if the Commission is concerned with maintaining legitimacy and 
avoiding non-implementation of its policies, it should react to changing levels of aggregate public 
attitudes towards the EU. Increases in aggregate public support signal to EU policy-makers, 
including Commissioners, that the citizenry wants more European integration (see Toshkov, 
2011). Seeking to maintain its legitimacy, the Commission should increase its policy-making 
activity, including increasing the number of legal acts unilaterally adopted when support for the 
EU is high. At the same time, if aggregate public support for the EU decreases, this signals a public 
attitude for less European integration, resulting in a decrease in Commission policy-making 
activity; that is a decrease in the number of legal acts unilaterally adopted by the Commission.  
 
H1:  The European Commission increases unilateral adoptions of legal acts when 




Of course, if the assumption that the Commission is concerned with maintaining institutional 
legitimacy is relaxed, conventional policy responsiveness in the Commission (i.e. more support 
for the EU leading to more unilateral legal act adoptions) is no longer expected.  
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As the Commission is an unelected body, it is relatively insulated from public punishment. 
Conversely, the Parliament is directly elected, and the Council of Ministers is indirectly elected 
(see Moravscik, 2002), meaning that both institutions can be more easily punished by the public 
than can the unelected Commission (e.g. Erikson et al., 1993; Ferejohn, 1986; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen, 2008; Stimson et al., 1995;). As expected, research has shown that the Parliament 
and Council do respond to the public, increasing policy outputs when support for the EU is higher 
and decreasing policy outputs when support for the EU is lower (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011). 
 
It is possible that responsibility trading among policy-making institutions is occurring in the EU, 
mimicking the pattern of venue-shopping that occurs between levels of government in the EU (e.g. 
Guiraudon, 2000; Princen, 2007). That is, when support for the EU is lower, the Parliament and 
Council reduce their legislative output (see Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011) creating policy gridlock 
(see Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Rudalevige, 2002 for more on policy gridlock). Research suggests 
that in the face of policy gridlock, executive actors use unilateral action to overcome the legislative 
impasse (Belco and Rottinghaus, 2014; Deering and Maltzman, 1999; Fine and Warber, 2012; 
Peake et al., 2012).  
 
In applying this understanding to the EU, we expect that the Commission (the executive branch of 
the EU) will continue initiating and sending policy proposals to the European Parliament and 
Council of Ministers for legislative consideration. However, the policy gridlock caused by a lack 
of legislative action leads to the Commission filling the policy-making vacuum by unilaterally 
adopting more legal acts outside of legislative channels. 
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Following this same logic, when support for the EU is high, the directly and indirectly elected 
bodies of the Parliament and Council will adopt more and/or further reaching legislative policy. 
With less policy gridlock, the Commission has less need to unilaterally adopt legal acts, as the 
work of governing the EU is conducted by the elected bodies.iii Thus, when support for the EU is 
high, we should expect the Commission to initiate more legislative acts but adopt fewer legal acts 
unilaterally. 
 
This suggests that the institutional structure of the EU may allow for the more publicly accountable 
institutions (i.e. the Parliament and Council) to respond to public attitudes regarding the EU in the 
conventionally expected way; by decreasing legislative policy output when the EU is unpopular 
and increasing legislative policy output when the EU is popular. However, when the more 
accountable institutions reduce policy output, the Commission, which is less publicly accountable, 
attempts to overcome the policy gridlock created by Parliamentary and Council inaction by 
increasing unilateral legal act adoptions. When the more accountable institutions increase their 
legislative policy output, the Commission reduces the unilateral adoption of legal acts accordingly.  
 
H2:  The European Commission decreases adoptions of legal acts when aggregate 




In this section, we first explicate the operationalization of the variables used in this study, which 
covers the time period of 1974, the start of the Eurobarometer, to 2008, the start of the Euro Crisis. 
The data sources are then discussed in detail. Finally, we focus on the methodological approach 
used in testing the above hypothesis. 
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Our dependent variable is the number of legal acts unilaterally adopted by the European 
Commission. Our data is matched to the half-year periodization of the Eurobarometer, (i.e. a 
Eurobarometer half-year). The number of legal acts unilaterally adopted by the Commission can 
be operationalized in multiple ways. There are three types of legal acts available to the 
Commission; directives, regulations, and decisions. Directives can be best understood as policy 
mandates in which member states are required to implement measures within their own legal 
systems that result in desired policy outcomes; a procedure known as transposition. Regulations 
differ from directives in that they carry the weight of law immediately (transposition is not 
necessary). Decisions require an entity within the jurisdiction of the EU to undertake, or refrain 
from some sort of action. Alternatively, a decision can provide a right, privilege, or obligation to 
an entity within the jurisdiction of the EU.   
 
Decisions differ substantially from directives and regulations in that they can be directed at one 
specific member state, a subset of member states, a business, or even an individual. Due to the 
unique nature and relatively narrow scope of decisions, it seems unlikely that EU-wide public 
opinion would influence decision adoption. Therefore, decisions are considered a poor 
operationalization of unilateral Commission legal act adoption and not examined in this study. 
 
Directives and regulations, however, are important legal measures which can raise controversies 
in EU member states (see König, 2008). They both can set policy that has a wide reach and broad 
scope, often affecting all people living within the EU, and, in some cases, those living outside of 
the EU.  Due to the importance of both directives and regulations for setting European policy, our 
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measure of unilateral Commission legal act adoption is operationalized as the number of directives 
plus the number of regulations unilaterally adopted by the Commission in a specific Eurobarometer 
half-year.iv This measure includes any directive or regulation that is adopted by the Commission 
without further need for approval from the Council and/or Parliament (For descriptive statistics 
regarding all variables used in this study, please see the Online appendix). 
 
The independent variables used in testing our hypothesis are the levels of aggregate positive, 
negative, and neutral public opinion concerning the EU. These are understood as the percentages 
of the EU population that are supportive of the EU (Europhilic), opposed to the EU (Eurosceptic) 
or indifferent towards the EU (neutral).v  
 
Using multiple independent variables, rather than a dichotomous variable indicating the level of 
Europhilia or Euroscepticism, is imperative to this analysis as these concepts are not flip sides of 
the same coin. Neutrality towards the EU is distinct from Europhilia and Euroscepticism, as it is 
neither outright support for the EU nor overt opposition to it, but rather approximates Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s (2001) “soft Euroscepticism” (see van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015)  Therefore, 
using a dichotomous independent variable risks conflating neutrality with either Europhilia or 
Euroscepticism. 
 
The measures used in this study reflect the weighted EU-wide aggregate answers to the 
Eurobarometer survey question, “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s 
membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, don’t 
know?”.  Specifically, Europhilia is operationalized as the percentage of the respondents in a given 
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Eurobarometer survey who believe their country’s EU membership is “a good thing”.  
Euroscepticism is operationalized as the percentage of the respondents to a given Eurobarometer 
survey who believe their country’s EU membership is “a bad thing”. Neutrality, which indicates 
neither support for nor opposition to the EU, is marked by the percentage of respondents who 
believe membership in the EU is “neither good nor bad”.vi In aggregating this data to the EU level, 
the percentage of respondents for each category, in each country, was weighted by the population 
of the country as a percentage of the total EU population at the time of the survey, and summed. 

















Figure 1: Aggregate Support, Neutrality and Euroscepticism 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the levels of aggregate Europe-wide public support for the EU, neutrality towards the EU, and 
opposition to the EU over time based on Eurobarometer surveys from Autumn 1974 through Autumn 2008. 
 
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates Europhilia is always greatest, followed by neutrality, and finally 
Euroscepticism. It further indicates higher levels of variation in the same order with a standard 
deviation of ~2.6 percentage points for Euroscepticism, ~4.1 for neutrality and ~6.5 for Europhilia. 
Overall, this suggests that there is more movement over time between Europhilia and neutrality 




Some control variables must be included in the below analysis as there is a possibility of correlation 
with both the independent and dependent variables. First, the economic union has been the 
historical, and still primary, focus of the EU. As research has suggested that broad economic 
conditions do influence attitudes towards the EU (see Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Banducci et 
al., 2009; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Hobolt and Leblond, 2009; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; 
Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014; de Vries, 2018), and further evidence suggests that public policy outputs 
are related to macroeconomic conditions (Bartels, 2015; Wlezien and Soroka, 2012), it is 
imperative to control for the economic conditions within the EU. This is done through the use of 
a measure of the unemployment rate in the EU.vii  
 
Further, as treaty changes necessitate significant policy activity, dummy variables indicating the 
first year in which a new major treaty change (i.e. the Single Europe Act, the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Nice Treaty) came into force are included. These variables are 
coded as a 1 in the European semester a treaty change came into effect, as well as the semester 
after a treaty change came into effect.  
 
Finally, as our theory suggests a possible confounding effect of European Parliament and Council 
of Ministers activity, we also include a measure for the number of pieces of legislation passed by 
the Council of Ministers in a given European semester. We focus on the Council of Ministers as 
our dataset ranges from 1974 through 2008, and for a significant amount of this period the 
European Parliament did not maintain co-decision powers with the Council of Ministers. While a 
blunt measure of legislative policy activity, as it does not differentiate between the scope and size 
of the policies created by the Council of Ministers, it does allow us to capture any general shifts in 
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policy-making activity. Unfortunately, data do not exist at current time to use a more fine-grained 
measure of legislative policy activity. 
 
Main variable data sources 
As stated above, the measures of public opinion are derived from the Eurobarometer survey series. 
The number and survey date of each Eurobarometer survey is presented in the Online appendix. 
 
The data concerning the number of directives and regulations unilaterally adopted by the 
Commission in a Eurobarometer half-year are derived from automatic data extraction from the 
EU’s online legislative archive, EUR-Lex.viii This data, originally structured by month, was 
collapsed to create a measure of the number of directives and regulations unilaterally adopted by 
the Commission in each Eurobarometer half-year. A directive or regulation was placed into a 
Eurobarometer half-year if it was adopted between the first day of the first month after a survey 
was conducted and the last day of the month the next survey was conducted. Thus, if survey 1 was 
conducted in January 2000 and survey 2 was conducted in June of 2000, any Commission directive 
or regulation with an adoption date between 1 February 2000 and 30 June 2000 would be included 
in the same Eurobarometer half-year. 
 
Methodological strategy 
Specification tests reveal serial correlation between observations in this data, as well as unit root 
and cointegrated processes across our dependent and independent variables.ix To address these 
issues, an Error Correction Model (ECM) is used to test the above hypotheses. ECMs regress first 
differences of the independent variables on the first differences of the dependent variable. Beyond 
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ECMs’ ability to address cointegrated processes, ECMs allow us to directly address the short-run 
(contemporaneous) and long-run (lagged) effects of the independent variables on change in the 
dependent variable. Our full models therefore take the following form: 
 
∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽1∆𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡+𝛽2𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1+𝛽3∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1+𝛽5𝐸𝑈 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡  
 
The next section of this paper tests the above hypothesis using ECMs.  This section is followed by 
a discussion of the findings, and their implications. 
 
Analysis 
Our first hypothesis argues that as Europhilia increases, so too should unilateral legal act adoptions 
by the Commission. The second hypothesis posits that higher levels of Europhilia result in fewer 























Table 1: Effect of Public Support on Unilateral Commission Legal Act Adoption 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Legal Act Adoptiont-1 -0.31 -0.51 -0.57 -0.73 
 (0.09)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.16)*** 
ΔSupportt -13.49 -16.44 -17.45 -12.25 
 (8.76) (7.57)** (7.44)** (7.57) 
Supportt-1 -10.65 -16.36 -16.52 -11.24 
 (5.70)* (5.79)*** (5.77)*** (5.31)** 
ΔUnemploymentt  -115.34 -77.49 -19.64 
  (58.72)* (55.95) (55.87) 
Unemploymentt-1  46.44 60.62 68.22 
  (18.56)** (20.56)*** (19.17)*** 
Single Europe Act   -130.83 -112.00 
   (95.49) (98.74) 
Maastricht Treaty   -264.14 -281.98 
   (68.49)*** (61.56)*** 
Amsterdam Treaty   270.42 322.31 
   (105.27)** (118.45)*** 
Nice Treaty   -41.49 -88.34 
   (309.14) (285.05) 
ΔCouncil Legislationt    -0.81 
    (0.62) 
Council Legislationt-1    -1.33 
    (0.62)** 
Constant 867.94 995.35 938.73 917.00 
 (381.00)** (340.08)*** (334.77)*** (308.26)*** 
R2 0.20 0.33 0.40 0.45 
N 68 68 68 68 
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Table 1 presents results for four ECMs of Europhilia on unilateral Commission legal act adoption. 
Model 1 considers support on its own, Model 2 controls for unemployment, Model 3 includes 
controls for treaty changes, and Model 4 controls for Council of Ministers policy activity. Our 
primary, and consistent finding across each of the Models in Table 1 is a significant (or marginally 
significant), negative effect for support on the change in unilateral Commission legal act adoptions 
both in the short-run (differenced) and long-run (lagged). This result indicates, in line with the 
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second hypothesis, that as support for the EU increases, unilateral Commission legal act adoptions 
decrease.  
 
Importantly, in Model 4, when the measure of Council legislative policy activity is included, the 
coefficient for both the change in the EU support variable, as well as the lagged EU support 
variable, shrinks significantly from that reported in Models 2 and 3. Further, the change in the EU 
support variable no longer shows a statistically significant relationship, whereas the lagged EU 
support variable maintains statistical significance, but at a diminished level. This, combined with 
the negative and statistically significant effect for the lagged version of the variable of Council 
legislative policy activity, indicates that the effect of Europhilia on the adoption of Commission 
legal acts substantially influences the effect of public Europhilia on unilateral Commission legal 
act adoption.  
 
In substantive terms, when we do not control for Council legislative policy activity (Model 3), the 
coefficient for the change in Europhilia is -17.45, indicating that for each percentage point 
Europhilia increased from the previous to the current half-year, unilateral Commission adoptions 
also decreased by roughly 17 (it should be noted that the 95% confidence interval ranges from -
2.6 to -32.3). The coefficient for lagged Europhilia is -16.52, indicating that for each percentage 
point of Europhilia in the previous Eurobarometer half-year, the number of legal acts adopted is 
expected to decrease by over 16 in the current half-year. In contrast, when Council legislative 
policy activity is included (Model 4), a percentage point increase in Europhilia from the previous 
to the current half-year results in roughly 12 fewer unilateral Commission adoptions. Similarly, 
for each percentage point of Europhilia in the previous Eurobarometer half-year, the number of 
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legal acts adopted by the Commission is expected to decrease by only about 11 in the current half-
year. In all this, indicates support for hypothesis 2, the Commission decreases adoptions when 
support increases 
Table 2: Effect of Public Euroscepticism on Unilateral Commission Legal Act Adoption 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Legal Act Adoptiont-1 -0.24 -0.40 -0.47 -0.73 
 (0.07)*** (0.10)*** (0.11)*** (0.16)*** 
ΔEuroscepticism 9.74 15.51 14.01 7.18 
 (15.28) (15.08) (14.20) (14.54) 
Euroscepticismt-1 6.56 21.25 22.15 11.23 
 (11.79) (13.32) (13.51) (10.92) 
ΔUnemploymentt  -98.74 -67.25 10.77 
  (61.07) (57.87) (61.09) 
Unemploymentt-1  43.18 57.23 68.61 
  (18.86)** (21.42)*** (19.68)*** 
Single Europe Act   -138.92 -112.55 
   (135.62) (130.83) 
Maastricht Treaty   -223.39 -265.87 
   (64.08)*** (62.95)*** 
Amsterdam Treaty   293.53 353.64 
   (108.93)*** (122.21)*** 
Nice Treaty   21.59 -68.71 
   (290.49) (259.18) 
ΔCouncil Legislationt    -0.98 
    (0.61) 
Council Legislationt-1    -1.80 
    (0.65)*** 
Constant 97.94 -308.71 -380.43 -380.43 
 (156.03) (229.60) (238.04) (238.04) 
R2 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.41 
N 68 68 68 68 
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Our analyses of Euroscepticism (Table 2) suggest that higher levels of opposition to the EU, and 
increases in opposition, may increase Commission adoptions of legal acts, although these effects 
are insignificant in all models, approaching statistical significance in some models. Importantly, 
however, one does see a decrease in the coefficient for the change in Euroscepticism and lagged 
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Euroscepticism in Model 4, while lagged Council legislative policy activity shows a negative and 
statistically significant relationship, similar to the effect seen in Table 1. This suggests support for 
the inverse of hypothesis 2. 
 
Our analyses of neutrality (Table 3) show that high levels of neutrality in the previous half-year 
have a strong positive and significant effect on the change in unilateral Commission legal act 
adoptions in the current half-year. Similar to the findings in Table 1, however, when a measure of 
Council legislative policy activity is included (Model 4), the substantive effect of neutrality 
towards the EU shrinks, and the measure of lagged neutrality changes from being highly significant 
in Models 1 through 3 to only moderate significance.  
 
Substantively, the effect of approximately 28 more adoptions for a one percentage point increase 
in neutrality (see Model 3) clearly indicates a stronger, but different effect than that of Europhilia 
on unilateral Commission legal act adoptions. At the same time, the decrease of over 12 adoptions 
when Council legislative policy activity is controlled for indicates strong support for the inverse 
of hypothesis 2 when considering neutrality as a type of “soft Euroscepticism” (van Elsas and van 








Table 3: Effect of Public Neutrality on Unilateral Commission Legal Act Adoption 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Legal Act Adoptiont-1 -0.37 -0.53 -0.59 -0.74 
 (0.09)*** (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.15)*** 
ΔNeutralityt 3.38 10.99 14.02 6.67 
 (11.67) (11.19) (11.30) (11.82) 
Neutralityt-1 22.31 27.50 27.72 15.64 
 (9.33)** (9.07)*** (9.17)*** (8.05)* 
ΔUnemploymentt  -94.18 -62.13 1.52 
  (56.66) (56.29) (65.07) 
Unemploymentt-1  39.828 52.55 63.14 
  (16.39)* (18.34)*** (17.97)*** 
Single Europe Act   -109.56 -97.49 
   (118.56) (125.36) 
Maastricht Treaty   -237.85 -261.45 
   (68.52)*** (60.07)*** 
Amsterdam Treaty   262.78 325.57 
   (116.97)** (127.31)** 
Nice Treaty   -59.24 -97.09 
   (270.37) (251.83) 
ΔCouncil Legislationt    -0.83 
    (0.59) 
Council Legislationt-1    -1.47 
    (0.68)** 
Constant -321.01 -654.01 -717.88 -104.80 
 (213.53) (252.37)** (257.43)*** (317.74) 
R2 0.20 0.30 0.36 0.43 
N 68 68 68 68 
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Each set of analyses offer similar findings for our controls. A positive change in unemployment 
has an insignificant or marginally significant short-run (differenced) negative effect on the change 
in legal act adoptions, but that higher levels of unemployment in the long-run (lagged) have a 
consistently significant positive effect on unilateral legal act adoptions by the Commission. This 
effect ranges between approximately 40 and 68 more adoptions for each percentage point increase 
in unemployment. Additionally, the Single Europe Act and Nice Treaty dummies have no 
significant impact on unilateral Commission adoption of legal acts, whereas the Maastricht Treaty 
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and Amsterdam Treaty both have statistically significant effects. The Maastricht Treaty shows a 
consistently negative effect, indicating that in the year after the Maastricht Treaty came into effect, 
the number of Commission legal acts unilaterally adopted dropped. This effect ranged from about 
-223 to almost -282. By contrast, the impact of the Amsterdam Treaty was positive, indicating that 
the number of unilateral legal act adoptions by the Commission increased in the first year the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into effect. This effect ranges from about 263 to almost 354. Finally, the 
error correction term in each model denoted by the lagged legal act adoption variable is negative, 
significant and near -0.74 in each model. This indicates a fairly quick return to the average or 
equilibrium level of change in the model following a change in public opinion or unemployment.  
 
Discussion 
This study sought to develop an understanding of the relationship between public attitudes towards 
the EU and unilateral legal act adoption by the European Commission. It was posited, following 
studies of policy responsiveness in the EU and its member states (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 2011; 
Williams, 2016, 2018), and theories of policy responsiveness originally developed for application 
in unelected bodies (Bevan, 2015; Casillas et al., 2011; Hall, 2013), that to maintain legitimacy, 
the Commission will increase unilateral legal act adoption when public support for the EU is 
higher, and decrease unilateral legal act adoption when public support for the EU is lower.  
 
However, if we relax the assumption that the Commission is concerned with legitimacy, the 
institutional structure of the EU allows for the European Commission to fill the policy vacuum 
created by legislative inaction in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament during 
periods of greater negative public attitudes towards the EU. Decreased public support for the EU 
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will lead to decreased legislative activity in the Parliament and Council (Bølstad, 2015; Toshkov, 
2011), which creates policy gridlock in the EU. In order to overcome the policy gridlock, the 
Commission, if unconcerned with maintaining legitimacy, increases the unilateral adoption of 
legal acts.  
 
Our findings indicate support for the second hypothesis. Specifically, we find that a higher level 
of support for the EU at time t-1, as well as increases in support for the EU between times t-1 and 
t, result in the Commission decreasing the number of legal acts unilaterally adopted between time 
t-1 and time t. We further find that more neutral opinion at time t-1 leads to the Commission 
increasing the number of legal acts unilaterally adopted between time t-1 and time t. 
Euroscepticism, on the other hand, had no statistically significant effect on the Commission’s 
unilateral adoptions. Importantly, the direct effects of public opinion become significantly smaller 
when a direct measure of Council legislative policy activity is included in the models, indicating 
support for the policy gridlock argument. 
 
These findings have significant implications for our understanding of democratic governance in 
the EU. Most importantly, they may indicate that public control of European policy-making may 
be constrained by the institutional design of the EU. It appears that, despite public opposition to 
the EU, the institutions may trade responsibility to continue policy-making activities. As the 
common normative understanding of democracy envisions public control of policy-makers (see 
Dahl, 1971; Pitkin, 1967; Powell, 2000), the above results indicate the EU may, indeed, suffer 
from a democratic deficit. 
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Although an important step in understanding political representation in the EU, greater research 
regarding responsiveness of European institutions, and the European Commission, specifically, to 
public attitudes is necessary. First, it is important to explore the asymmetries in the above findings. 
In particular, it may be useful to develop a deeper understanding of the substantive differences in 
the effects of public neutrality towards the EU as opposed to public Euroscepticism. 
 
Further, it may prove fruitful to examine more closely the scope and reach of the acts unilaterally 
adopted by the Commission during periods of low support. If Commission legal acts adopted when 
public support for the EU is low are relatively small in scope and reach, this would indicate that 
any trade-offs made between the institutions of the EU are not equal. This is particularly true if 
Commission legal acts are small in scope and reach in comparison to the acts adopted by the 
Parliament and Council during periods of high support. If Commission legal acts are small in scope 
and reach, this would suggest that the Commission would be filling the policy-making vacuum left 
by Parliament and Council inaction, but the Commission would not fill it to the same level. 
 
Beyond a deeper examination of the possibility of responsibility trading, other avenues of future 
research may also be interesting. In particular, useful analysis would be to examine how public 
attitudes concerning specific policy areas influence Commission legal act adoptions in those 
domains. For example, if the public is more supportive of environmental regulation, will the 
Commission alter the number of legal acts it adopts in the area of environmental regulation?  
 
Overall, the above results are highly suggestive, but offer several more questions concerning the 
effects of public attitudes regarding the EU on policy-making activity in the EU. It is clear that 
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support does not lead to the unilateral adoption of more Commission legal acts, and it appears that 
the trading of policy-making responsibilities may be occurring in EU institutions during periods 
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i As this study is interested in policy processes in the EU, and the European Commission specifically, it is concerned 
with the overall amount of policy being created unilaterally by the European Commission. Future research will build 
upon this study and examine the substance of the policies being created. 
ii These studies are concerned with the Commission insofar as it is the point of legislative genesis in the EU. Crombez 
and Hix (2016) examine both directives and regulations, while Häge and Toshkov (2011) study only directives. 
iii As the point of legislative genesis [isn’t there a verb missing, such as “shows”], policy adopted by elected bodies 
requires the Commission to initiate more legislative policy, however, these initiated legislative acts are not unilaterally 
adopted by the Commission. 
iv Alternatively, poorer fitting analyses on regulations alone lead to the same inferences presented here. However, 
alternative and better fitting analyses driven by the EU age variable and no other variables were also found for 
directives. Broadly, this suggests that the majority of responsiveness for the Commission takes place through 
regulation. However, whether this is actually driven by differences in legislative tools or more substantive differences 
such as the potential importance of individual policies is hard to judge without a much more fine-grained analyses. 
While nearly all directives are quite impactful in terms of regulatory costs only some regulations come with similar 
importance. Further, while it is clear that the effect of public opinion regarding the EU may vary by policy type and 
substance, this is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an interesting avenue for future research.  
v As a robustness check a combined measure of public attitude towards the EU was used. This measure was 
operationalized by coding Europhilia as 1, neutrality as 0, and Europscepticism as -1, and an EU-wide average, 
weighting by national population was constructed. The results of models using this independent variable are included 
in the Online appendix. The results support the those reported in the main tables of this study. 
vi Van Elsas and van der Brug (2015) argue that a combination of neutrality and Euroscepticism actually accounts for 
Taggart and Szczerbiak's (2004) concept of "soft Euroscepticism", as indifference works towards the EU in a similar 
manner to opposition. In alternative analyses we combined neutrality and Euroscepticism into a single “soft 
Euroscepticism” measure (see the Online appendix). The results are consistent with our findings for neutrality, the 
model is, however, poorer fitting, suggesting that neutrality and Euroscepticism, as measured, are not strictly related 
or the same.  
vii This measure is taken from Toshkov (2011) and derived from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) data. A measure of unemployment by EU semester was created by weighting country figures 
by population, and calculating the mean of quarterly data. The mean of Q1 and Q2 was used as a measure of 
unemployment for the first EU semester of a given year, the mean of Q3 and Q4 was used as a measure of 
unemployment for the second EU semester of a given year. Other operationalizations of macroeconomic conditions 
were considered, but ultimately, not used for two reasons. First, maintaining comparability across existing research 
(e.g. Toshkov, 2011) is imperative. Altering the operationalization of macroeconomic conditions may confound 
comparison across studies. Second, other measures present issues with operationalization. For example, measures such 
as gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, or a misery index are greatly affected by the introduction of the common 
currency (the Euro) in the EU in 1999/2000. As our dataset spans 1974 to 2008, using any measure that is closely 
linked to currency would confound the analysis. For models using EU wide GDP see the Online appendix. 
viii The EUR-Lex data were originally extracted by Dimiter Toshkov in Ocotober 2012. 
ix Augmented Dicky-Fuller unit-root tests demonstrated evidence of unit roots for our dependent, independent and 
unemployment variables with p-values between 0.41 and 0.92, failing to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. First, 
differencing corrected this issue with all p-values less than 0.000. Engle-Granger cointegration tests across all 12 
models rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration with a p-value less than 0.10 and less than 0.05 for each of our 
Model 3s. Due to the strong evidence of unit root and cointegreated processes, the use of an ECM model is appropriate 
and necessary.  
x We test the effects of Europhilia, Euroscepticism, and neutrality towards the EU in separate models as these variables 
are strongly, although not perfectly, correlated with one another, and therefore including them in the same model could 
lead to issues of multicollinearity. To confirm this concern, models including combinations of two attitudes 
(Europhilia, Euroscepticism, and neutrality) were also considered. However, multicollinearity did prove to be too 
large an issue based on post-estimated variance inflation factors (VIFs). Some models had VIFs over 10, with almost 
all having a VIF over 4, which is especially problematic with smaller sample sizes (e.g. Hair et al., 2010), such as that 
                                                 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                             
in this study. The attitudinal measures clearly do differentiate (see Figure 1) with an increase in one not guaranteeing 
an increase in another; however, they are also clearly related, both practically and by construction given the survey 
instrument. In fact, these measures can be thought of as different operationalizations of the same concept, public 
attitude towards the EU. While it is valid to consider multiple measures for a concept, rarely is it advisable to include 
them in the same model both for practical and methodological reasons. Therefore, based on practicality and the issues 
noted concerning multicollinearity tests, we include models of each measure individually. We report the results of 
these tests in the Online appendix. While multicollinearity makes it difficult to interpret the direction and significance 
of the individual independent variables, F-tests suggest that the variables are jointly significant. 
 
